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Speraw: No Bullying Allowed: A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute

NO BULLYING ALLOWED: A CALL FOR A
NATIONAL ANTI-BULLYING STATUTE TO
PROMOTE A SAFER LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 1999, the most shocking act of school violence in this
nation’s history occurred at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado.1 On this date, two students entered the school and proceeded
to kill twelve fellow students and one teacher before turning their
weapons on themselves.2 This incident alerted many educators and
parents around the nation to the violence that can result from bullying in
our schools.3
In response to the Columbine incident, many states adopted
legislation aimed at preventing bullying and its potentially disastrous

See, e.g., Alan J. Borsuk, Columbine: One Year Later, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 19,
2000, at A1 (“Although the list of schools that have become sites of lethal violence has other
entries, none has been quite as galvanizing as Columbine.”); Counselor Marilyn Towsey,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2001, at T12 (quoting the principal of Liberty Middle School in
Ashland, Virginia, as stating that “Columbine changed everything” with regard to school
security and the perception of school bullying).
2
See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Terror in Littleton: The Overview; 15 Bodies Are Removed
From School in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1. Eric Harris, eighteen, and Dylan
Klebold, seventeen, brought in weapons, including bombs, two shotguns, a semi-automatic
rifle, and a semi-automatic pistol. Id. The two teens were described by other students as
loners and outcasts who called themselves the “Trench coat Mafia,” and had an apparent
affinity for violent video games. Id. The two were arrested in 1998 for breaking into a car,
and Eric Harris also maintained a web site and had been accused by a parent of threatening
to kill her son. Id. Despite these warning signs, school authorities and fellow students
stated that they never thought Harris and Klebold were capable of the violence they
unleashed. Id.
3
See Susan Atteberry-Smith, Five Years After Columbine, Bullying Still a Fact of Life in
Springfield Schools, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Apr. 20, 2004, at A1 (stating that according
to some school officials, the excessive bullying of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold caused
their deadly shooting spree); Caren Burmeister, Bullies Not Welcome Program Aims to Stamp
Out Intimidation, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 20, 2003, at L-1 (quoting a school resource
center director as stating that “Columbine sums up what happens when bullying isn’t dealt
with . . . [i]t doesn’t go away and can manifest itself with violence,” and also citing a study
done by the U.S. Department of Education and the Secret Service finding that of the
instigators of thirty-seven extreme acts of school violence occurring between 1974 and 2000,
nearly three-quarters felt bullied, persecuted, or threatened by their peers); Jennifer
Ralston, Bullies and Bullying, SCH. LIBR. J., May 1, 2005, at 49 (suggesting that bullying was a
precipitating factor in the violence that occurred at Columbine).
1
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consequences from occurring in their schools.4 In addition, national antibullying legislation has been proposed in the U.S. House of
Representatives to amend the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act to include measures to prevent bullying and
harassment.5 However, the efficacy of state measures has not been fully
analyzed and no consensus has been reached as to the effect of state antibullying statutes on curbing school bullying and violence.6
Most current anti-bullying legislation focuses on physical and verbal
bullying, yet other types of bullying, such as relational bullying, can also
cause violence and other problems.7 While physical violence is the most
recognizable damage that can result from bullying, psychological injury
is a type of damage that is hard to recognize and can be very harmful to
a child’s well-being and school performance.8 Because physical violence
and injury are relatively easy to recognize and sanction, the main
difficulty in crafting an anti-bullying statute is being able to
constitutionally prohibit and sanction verbal bullying and harassment.
4
According to Bullypolice.org, forty-one states have adopted some form of antibullying legislation. Bully Police USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last visited Apr. 9,
2010). These states include, in chronological order of year adopted starting in 1999:
Georgia, New Hampshire, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, West Virginia,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Arizona, California, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, Tennessee, Maine, Nevada, Idaho, South
Carolina, Arkansas, New Mexico, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Kentucky, Utah, Florida, North Carolina, Wyoming, and
Alabama. Id. Bullypolice.org also grades each of these states’ anti-bullying laws based on
how effective they are. Id.
5
H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004) (this legislation was proposed in the
House and referred to the Subcommittee on Education Reform of the House Committee on
Education and the Workforce, however, no further action was taken).
6
See Kathleen Hart, Note, Sticks and Stones and Shotguns at School: The Ineffectiveness of
Constitutional Antibullying Legislation as a Response to School Violence, 39 GA. L. REV. 1109,
1122–24 (2005) (analyzing the effectiveness of state anti-bullying legislation in preventing
harassment and bullying in schools); Stuart W. Twemlow, et. al., Creating a Peaceful School
Learning Environment: A Controlled Study of an Elementary School Intervention to Reduce
Violence, 158 AM. J. PSYCH. 808 (2001) (stating that few programs to prevent school violence
have been evaluated).
7
See Joan Arehart-Treichel, Bullying Need Not Be Physical to Have Dire Consequences, 42
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 30 (2007) (discussing relational bullying, which is socially manipulative
nonphysical behavior intended to harm another person, and the psychological pain it can
cause children in school).
8
See Denise Lavoie, Suicide Raises Questions About School’s Vigilance, South Bend trib.,
Mar. 31, 2010, at A6 (discussing the suicide of a teen girl who was mercilessly harassed,
threatened, and taunted, as well as several other cases illustrating the adverse effects of
bullying); Twemlow, supra note 6, at 808. This report in the American Journal of Psychiatry
found that increased psychiatric consultation and zero tolerance for bullying in an
elementary school raised the standardized scores of the school’s students and resulted in a
decreased number of discipline problems compared to a control elementary school with
only regular psychiatric consultation.
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Therefore, an effective anti-bullying policy must address the myriad
types of bullying and the different effects such bullying can have on
students.
A comprehensive national anti-bullying statute would allow school
officials to better deal with the different harms associated with bullying
and would bring all the states into line with a single standard for
addressing bullying in the special context of the school environment.
The most important element of anti-bullying statutes needing
standardization is the definition of bullying and what behavior or speech
constitutes bullying. This will help schools diagnose all types of bullying
and the harms that can arise from them. The focus of this Note will be to
define bullying behavior that can be sanctioned without violating the
First Amendment.
Part II of this Note discusses the Supreme Court decisions and
legislation dealing with student speech and the First Amendment,
provides an overview of harassment and discrimination law under two
federal statutes, introduces the contents of state anti-bullying legislation,
and briefly states the limits of congressional power under the Spending
Clause.9 Next, Part III discusses the impact of these areas of law on
potential anti-bullying legislation.10 Part IV discusses the advantages of
a national anti-bullying standard and proposes a model anti-bullying
statute that could effectively accomplish the aims of prior state antibullying legislation.11 Finally, Part V offers a model anti-bullying statute
that attempts to balance the competing interests of protecting students
and respecting the First Amendment.12
II. BACKGROUND
This Note centers on crafting a national anti-bullying statute that
would effectively deal with bullying in schools. Guidelines established
by the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents are important
considerations in crafting verbal bullying and harassment legislation.
9
See infra Parts II.A–D (discussing Supreme Court student speech decisions, Title IX
law, Title VII law, and the power of Congress under the Spending Clause).
10
See infra Part III (finding that Supreme Court decisions and Title IX law are not
sufficient to prevent bullying and harassment in school and that Title VII can offer
guidance).
11
See infra Part IV (discussing advantages a national anti-bullying policy would offer
and proposing an anti-bullying statute that would accomplish the goals of reducing
bullying and the harm it produces).
12
See infra Part V (concluding that national anti-bullying legislation based on the model
code proposed in this Note would help to reduce bullying and its consequences in schools
and set the extent to which a school can regulate student speech to protect students from
bullying).
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Major Supreme Court cases about student speech help set the general
limits within which schools may prohibit student speech to combat
verbal bullying and harassment.
Below, Part II.A begins with a discussion of the “three pillars” of the
Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence.13 Part II.B examines the
permissible regulations on harassing and discriminatory speech under
Title VII and Title IX.14 Part II.C describes state anti-bullying statutes
and their respective definitions of bullying.15 Finally, Part II.D discusses
the power of Congress under the Spending Clause to place conditions on
the receipt of federal funds.16
A. The Three Pillars of Supreme Court Student Speech Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has established three standards, commonly
known as the “Three Pillars,” by which it measures the constitutionality
of school sanctions on student speech.17 First, in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District the Court established what has been called the
material disruption standard.18 Next, Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser held that Tinker is not the only standard by which to measure the
constitutionality of sanctions on student speech and that students’ First
Amendment rights in school are not as extensive as those of adults in
other settings.19 Finally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the
Court recognized that schools have greater authority to prohibit speech
in school-sponsored activities if the speech can reasonably be attributed
to the school itself.20 In crafting a national anti-bullying statute, each of
these standards must be analyzed as to their effectiveness and use as
applied to bullying.21
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the standards the Supreme Court has established for
evaluating student free speech rights).
14
See infra Part II.B (focusing on Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) claims for student-onstudent sexual harassment, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) claims for “hostile
workplace environment” harassment and discrimination).
15
See infra Part II.C (examining recent state anti-bullying statutes categorized by their
definition of bullying and looking at their effectiveness of curbing bullying and its effects in
schools).
16
See infra Part II.D (describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of congressional
power under the Spending Clause and the limits the Court has placed on it).
17
See infra Parts II.A.1–3 (setting out the standards established by the Supreme Court in
Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier).
18
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
19
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
20
484 U.S. 258 (1988).
21
See infra Parts III.A.1–2 (analyzing the effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s standards
in the anti-bullying context); infra Parts IV.B–C (setting out and discussing a Model Antibullying Statute and contributions from certain Supreme Court cases).
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The Material Disruption Standard

Tinker considered students’ First Amendment rights in school during
school hours.22 Tinker involved students who wore armbands to school
in protest of the Vietnam War in violation of a school policy adopted
subsequently and intended to punish these specific students.23 The
Court held that the school’s condemnation of the students’ peaceful
expression of their views was unconstitutional because the silent protest
did not disrupt the school environment.24 The opinion laid the
foundation for future school expression challenges.25
Tinker is
considered a landmark case because it definitively established that
“students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”26
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Id. This policy was adopted in response to school principals becoming aware of a plan
by a group of adults and students to publicize their support for a truce in the Vietnam War
by wearing black armbands during the holiday season. Id. The school policy stated that if
a student wore an armband to school, he or she would be asked to remove it and if he or
she refused, the student would be sent home and suspended. Id. On December 16, 1965,
Mary Beth and Christopher Tinker wore black armbands to school. Id. They both were
sent home, suspended from school, and not allowed to come back unless they did not wear
the armbands. Id. Neither student returned to school until after New Year’s Day when the
period during which they had planned to wear the armbands was over. Id.
24
Id. at 514. The Court found no evidence that the school officials could reasonably have
determined that there would be a substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities caused by the students wearing black armbands. Id. Therefore, the Court
found that “the silent, passive ‘witness of the armbands’” was not a form of expression that
the school officials could restrict or punish. Id.
25
Id. at 508–13. “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.” Id. at 508.
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.
Id. at 509. “The classroom is particularly the marketplace of ideas. The nation’s future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth . . . . ” Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
26
Id. at 506. See Nadine Strossen, Essay, Students’ Rights and How They are Wronged, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 457, 458 (1998) (Strossen was president of the ACLU and explained that Tinker
was the high water mark for student speech rights and that subsequent Supreme Court
decisions have eroded Tinker’s affirmation of student speech rights); Hart, supra note 6, at
1122–24 (stating that the Court in Tinker shifted the focus for the basis of school power from
one where the schools had the power to indoctrinate students in the values and traditions
of our society, to one in which a school’s purpose is to engender views that attempt to
reconstruct the social order, and that the Court’s conception of the proper role of schools
has guided its analysis of student rights ever since); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond
Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student
22
23
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Most importantly, the Court held that a restriction on student speech
violated the First Amendment unless it was shown that the expression
created a substantial and material disruption of the school
environment.27 Despite subsequent cases, this material disruption
standard remains viable and is still the starting point for analysis of
student free speech rights.28
The opinion did not have unanimous support, however; Justice
Black’s dissent immediately called into question Tinker’s effect on a
school’s ability to discipline its students and to regulate student speech.29
Justice Black averred that the Court did not allow enough deference for
school officials to maintain discipline and order.30 In the long term,
Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 649 (2000) (stating that Tinker is considered by many
scholars to be “the apex of student speech rights”).
27
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. A prohibition of speech cannot be sustained where no finding
is made “that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school . . . . ’” Id. (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). “Clearly, the
prohibition of expression . . . without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”
Id. at 511; see Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker In the Wake of
Columbine, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2000). Ramey explained:
[T]he Court set the standard that a student may express his or her
opinion, even on controversial subjects, essentially anywhere “on the
campus during the authorized hours,” “if he does so without
‘materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without
colliding with the rights of others.”
Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13). See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1125 (stating that the
Tinker test focuses on “the actual effect or results of the regulated speech or expression”);
Carmen N. Snook, Comment, Oregon’s “Bully Bill”: Are We Needlessly Repressing Student
Speech In the Name of School Safety?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 657, 669 (2002) (stating that the
important element of the Tinker standard is the effect of the student’s speech, not the
content of the student’s speech). But see Hart, supra note 6, at 1125 n.109 (noting that the
Court considered both the disruptive effect of the speech, as well as whether the act of
speech was disruptive itself, in making its determination).
28
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (the Court began its examination
of student speech rights with Tinker). See also, e.g., Ronna Greff Schneider, Freedom of
Expression and Violence at School, 1 EDUC. L. § 2:27 (2008) (discussing recent student speech
rights cases, many of which began with or included in their analysis, the Tinker standard).
29
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting). “[I]f the time has come when pupils of
state-supported schools . . . can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds
on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness
in this country fostered by the judiciary.” Id. at 518. Justice Black’s vigorous dissent
concluded, “I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the
Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender
control of the American public school system to public school students.” Id. at 526.
30
Justice Black believed that the majority had taken the “power to control pupils by the
elected ‘officials of state supported public schools . . . ’ [and] in ultimate effect transferred
[it] to the Supreme Court.” Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted).
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Justice Black’s concerns seem well-founded, and his dissent has been
endorsed and cited by a majority of the Court in subsequent student
speech decisions.31
2.

An Unclear Second Pillar

In the Court’s second pillar of student speech jurisprudence, Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court considered the constitutionality
of student Matthew Fraser’s suspension for giving a speech containing
graphic and explicit sexual metaphors at a school assembly.32 The Court
upheld Fraser’s punishment because the school had authority to prohibit
such speech.33 The opinion distinguished the sexual content of the
speech in Fraser from the political content of the speech in Tinker.34 Next,
the Court retreated from Tinker’s material disruption standard by
stressing that the constitutional rights of students in public schools were
not as extensive as those held by adults in other settings.35 This is
because of the age and maturity of students, as well as their propensity
for being impressionable.36
31
See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 417 (discussing Justice Black’s dissent in its analysis of
student speech jurisprudence). The Court noted that it had signaled a break from Tinker by
quoting Justice Black’s dissent in Fraser. Id. at 418 n.7 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)).
32
478 U.S. at 677–78. The speech at the center of Fraser was given at a high school
assembly where Fraser was nominating a fellow student for an elective office. Id. at 677.
Two teachers with whom Fraser had discussed the contents of his speech advised him that
it was inappropriate, that he probably should not deliver it, and that if he did, he could face
severe consequences. Id. at 678. A school counselor observed the other students’ reaction
to the speech, during which some hooted and yelled, others made sexually graphic
gestures, and still others seemed embarrassed and bewildered. Id. One teacher even noted
that she was forced to discuss the speech instead of conducting a part of the class lesson the
next day. Id. Fraser was suspended under a school disciplinary rule that stated, “Conduct
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited,
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.” Id. At a disciplinary review
of Fraser’s suspension, the hearing officer determined that Fraser’s speech was “indecent,
lewd, and offensive,” and fell within the meaning of obscene contained in the school
disciplinary rule. Id. at 678–79.
33
Id. at 685.
34
Id. at 680. The Court reasoned that there was a “marked distinction between the
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent’s
speech.” Id. The Court also found that the sanctions imposed on Fraser were not related to
any political viewpoint. Id. at 685.
35
Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985)).
36
The Court referred to the right of an adult to express an anti-draft viewpoint in
offensive terms and distinguished that right because the same latitude need not be granted
to students in a public school. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (involving
an anti-draft protester who wore a jacket into a courthouse that had profane language on
the back)). In addition, the Court quoted a Second Circuit concurring opinion for the
proposition that “the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
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Fraser established that a school may restrict lewd, vulgar speech that
it deems inconsistent with its basic educational mission.37 However,
Fraser is imprecise, confusing lower courts as to its application.38 This
lack of clarity results in inconsistent decisions among the lower federal
courts when applying Fraser to student speech challenges.39
Commentators differ on whether Fraser represents a new category of
permissible speech regulation for lewd and indecent speech or a broader
power that allows schools to regulate speech they deem inconsistent
with their basic educational missions.40 The Court has specifically stated
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.” Id. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of
Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring
in result)).
37
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. In making its determination, the Court recognized limitations
in its prior jurisprudence on a speaker’s right to reach an unlimited audience. Id. at 684.
These limitations include “where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may
include children.” Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). Also included is
“an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.”
Id. at 684–85 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)). In addition, the Court
noted that the freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in the school setting
must be balanced against “society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.” Id. at 681. The Court also cited to Thomas
Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, which was adopted by the House of
Representatives, as well as the comparable rules for the Senate, which prohibit
representatives and senators from using indecent or abusive language in Congressional
proceedings. Id. at 681–82 (citing JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE
§§ 359, 360, reprinted in MANUAL AND RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO.
97-271, at 158–59 (1982); SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 97-2, Rule XIX, at 568–69, 588–91
(1981)).
38
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007) (stating that the mode of analysis
employed in Fraser is unclear and that at best, two principles can be distilled from the
opinion: (1) students’ constitutional rights “in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”; and (2) Tinker’s mode of analysis is
not absolute).
39
See Hart, supra note 6, at 126 n.119, 120 (stating that some commentators and lower
federal courts see Fraser as creating a specific exception to the First Amendment for lewd
and indecent student speech, while others see it as establishing a school’s right to regulate
speech that can be seen as school endorsed); see also Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment
Policies in Public Schools: How Vulnerable Are They?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 52, 53 (2002) (stating that
Fraser allows a school to suppress lewd and indecent speech as a second category of
allowable student speech restriction); Lynn Mostoller, Note & Comment, Freedom of Speech
and Freedom from Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Public Schools: The Nexus Between
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education, 33 N.M. L. REV. 533, 539 (2003) (noting that the Third and
Ninth Circuits each view “lewd and indecent” speech as separate categories of allowable
speech regulation in public schools). But see, e.g., McCarthy at 541–42 (stating that the
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all follow a more expansive view of Fraser
which simply allows schools to regulate in an effort “to teach ‘habits and manners of
civility’”) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)).
40
See supra note 39 (explaining commentators’ divergent views about the import of the
Fraser holding).
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only that Fraser stands for two propositions.41 First, a student’s free
speech rights in public school are not the same as those of an adult in
other settings, and second, Tinker’s standard is not the only one on which
schools can rely to regulate student speech.42
3.

School-Sponsored Speech Sanctions and Subsequent Supreme Court
Cases Addressing First Amendment Rights

The last of the Court’s three pillars of student speech rights
jurisprudence, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, involved a
challenge to a school’s removal of certain articles from its student-run
newspaper.43 The Court held that schools may restrict student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities if the school’s “actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”44 The Court
distinguished the student speech at issue in Tinker and Fraser from the
student speech in Kuhlmeier on that basis.45
41
See supra note 38 (discussing the definitive propositions that the Supreme Court has
distilled from the Fraser opinion).
42
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05.
43
484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). The two articles in question were removed from the paper
due to the principal’s concerns about their content. Id. at 263–64. The first article
addressed the pregnancies of three of the school’s students and the other dealt with the
impact of divorce on students at the school. Id. at 263. The principal’s chief concerns about
the pregnancy article were that the false names used may not have been sufficient to keep
the girls’ identities secret, and that the references to sexual activity and birth control may be
inappropriate for some of the younger students. Id. His chief concern with the divorce
article was that the student’s parents had not been allowed to respond to the remarks in the
article or consent to its publication. Id. The principal felt that he had to make an
immediate decision because there was not enough time to make changes to the paper and
any delay in printing would prevent the paper from being published by the end of the
school year. Id. at 263–64.
44
Id. at 273. The Court believed that a school must be able to set standards for speech
that is “disseminated under its auspices” higher than those outside of the school
environment and that schools may refuse to disseminate any of its students’ speech that
does not meet these higher standards. Id. at 271–72. Not to allow this would “unduly
constrain[] [schools] from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
adjust normally to his environment.’” Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954)). First, the Court summed up its holding by stating that the standard it
established was to be used to determine when a school may decide not to lend its name
and resources to student expression. Id. at 272–73. Secondly, the Court said that the First
Amendment was only violated when the decision to censor an expressive activity had no
valid educational purpose is the First Amendment is violated. Id. at 273.
45
Id. at 270–71 (“The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different
from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote
particular student speech.”). “The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.” Id. at 271.
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Kuhlmeier stands for the proposition that educators have greater
authority to control student speech that can be reasonably perceived as
“bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school” than to control speech that
cannot be perceived as school-sponsored or acknowledged.46 This is a
narrow category of student speech—speech that could be perceived as
attributable to the school.47 Thus, in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, the
Supreme Court established three standards for measuring student
speech rights in the school setting.48
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the Court once again dealt
with a sanction affecting First Amendment rights.49 Justice Scalia,
writing for a plurality of the Court, found a St. Paul, Minnesota,
ordinance prohibiting cross burning and which relied on the “fighting
words” doctrine facially unconstitutional because of over breadth and
held that content-neutrality is constitutionally necessary for any speech
regulation.50 The reasoning of the Court appears to create a new
formulation of how and why “fighting words” and other categories of
speech may be regulated.51 Thus, any regulation of speech must be

“The latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Id. The
Court believed that this second category of activities “may be fairly characterized as part of
the school curriculum,” as long as they are supervised by faculty and designed to impart
knowledge or skills to students. Id. The Court stated that educators have greater control
over this second form of student expression. Id.
46
Id. at 271. The Court supported this holding by stating that this greater control was
permitted to “assure that participants [in school activities] learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may
be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are
not erroneously attributed to the school.” Id.
47
Id. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
48
See supra Parts II.A.1–3 (discussing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier and the standards
they established for regulating student speech).
49
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
50
Id. at 381. The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because it prohibited
speech otherwise permissible solely on the basis of the content of the speech. Id. Justice
Scalia stated that “fighting words” as well as other presumably less-protected categories of
speech could only “consistently with the First Amendment[] be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.” Id. at 383–84.
51
Id. at 386 (“[T]he exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First Amendment
simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words
are, despite their verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication.
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck[.]”). The Court stated that, in the
context of proscribable speech such as fighting words, obscenity, and defamation,
regulation did not violate the First Amendment if “the basis for the content discrimination
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entirely content-neutral, but the lack of a clear majority consensus, as
well as the vehemence with which the Justices critiqued each other’s
opinions, suggest that R.A.V. does not establish a bright-line rule.52
The Court’s latest student speech case is Morse v. Frederick, which
involved a sign that a portion of the Court found promoted illegal drug
use.53 The majority upheld the suspension and also held that a school
official may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student
speech that can be reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug
use.54 In reaching this conclusion, the Court appealed to its student
speech precedents in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.55 It is unclear whether
Morse establishes a new standard for measuring only student expression
promoting illegal drug use or whether it changes the entire landscape of
student speech regulation.56 There is, however, another possible
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” Id. at
388.
52
See id. at 398 (White, J., concurring) (“In the present case, the majority casts aside longestablished First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an
untried theory. This is hardly a judicious way of proceeding, and the Court’s reasoning in
reaching its result is transparently wrong.”). “Any contribution of this holding to First
Amendment jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily signals that
expressions of violence . . . are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order
and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First
Amendment.” Id. at 402. “I regret what the Court has done in this case. The majority
opinion signals one of two possibilities: It will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will
not. Either result is disheartening.” Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
stated that the majority’s position “lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence,”
“wreaks havoc in an area of settled law,” and “cannot withstand scrutiny.” Id. at 425–26
(Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools:
The Validity of Schools’ Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences If They Do Not, 28
AKRON L. REV. 187, 192-94 (1995) (discussing the strong, differing opinions on the
reasoning used to invalidate the ordinance in R.A.V.).
53
551 U.S. 393 (2007). The sign was held by a student (Frederick) standing along the
street in front of his school as the Olympic Torch Relay passed by. Id. at 396. The principal
asked Frederick to take the sign down, but he refused to do so. Id. The principal then
ordered Frederick to her office and suspended him for ten days under a school policy that
prohibited assembly or expression advocating substances illegal to minors. Id. at 398.
54
Id. at 403. The Court reasoned that “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school
environment[]’. . . and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug
use.” Id. at 408.
55
Id. at 403–06. The Court recognized the following propositions from its precedent: (1)
the continuing viability of Tinker’s material disruption standard; (2) that Fraser meant at
least that the mode of analysis employed in Tinker is not absolute and that students’
constitutional rights in school are not coextensive with those of adults in other settings; and
(3) that schools have a greater right to restrict speech that can reasonably be attributed to
them. Id.
56
Compare Charles Chulack, The First Amendment Does Not Require Schools to Tolerate
Student Expression That Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug Use: Morse v. Frederick, 46
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standard stemming from congressional legislation that has been deemed
constitutional by the Court.
B. Permissible Regulations of Harassing or Discriminatory Speech
1.

Title IX and Student-on-Student Harassment

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) prohibits
discrimination based on sex in any federally funded education program
or activity.57 The plaintiff in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
brought a Title IX claim for student-on-student harassment.58 The
Supreme Court definitively established a private cause of action seeking
damages under Title IX.59 An even more recent decision from the Third
Circuit, Saxe v. State College Area School District, casts doubt on the extent
to which a school policy based on harassment can be used to curb
student speech, but the Supreme Court has not commented on the
reasoning or impact of this decision.60
a.

Title IX’s Scope and Constitutionality Established

In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court
established a private cause of action against a school district for studenton-student sexual harassment.61 This case involved a fifth-grade
student’s mother who brought a claim against the board of education
alleging that her daughter had been the victim of sexual harassment by
another student in her class.62 The crux of the petitioner’s argument was
DUQ. L. REV. 521 (2008) (treating Morse as simply setting a standard by which a school can
regulate speech advocating illegal drug use), and Christy L. Young, Constitutional Law—
First Amendment Rights—The First Amendment Does Not Require Public Schools to Tolerate
Student Speech Reasonably Interpreted as Encouraging Illegal Drug Use, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 371
(2008) (same), with Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-Line
Rule, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 225, 225 (2008) (stating that the Morse opinion does not help
clarify the law surrounding school policies prohibiting harassment, leaving lower courts to
issue rulings that are inconsistent).
57
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). The statute reads in pertinent part: “No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” Id.
58
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
59
Id.
60
240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
61
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
62
Id. at 632. The suit sought both injunctive and monetary damages under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. Id. at 632–33. This harassment was alleged to have
occurred over several months and happened under the supervision of three separate
teachers. Id. at 633–34. Petitioner’s daughter (LaShonda) purportedly reported each of
these incidents to the supervising teacher, but no disciplinary action was taken against the
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that the school did not take steps to alleviate the harassing situation
despite repeated reports of incidents to teachers and the principal.63
The Court held that, in limited circumstances, intentional
indifference by a school to known acts of harassment amounts to a
violation of Title IX and justifies a private action for damages.64 In its
opinion, the Court cited precedent recognizing that Title IX focuses on
the benefited class and not the perpetrator, an implied private right of
action under Title IX exists, and money damages are available in such
suits.65 In determining whether the school district could be held liable,

student. Id. LaShonda’s mother also followed up two of the complaints by directly
contacting the supervising teacher. Id. at 634. On the first of these occasions, LaShonda’s
mother was assured that the school principal (Principal Querry) had been informed of the
incidents. Id. The harassment finally ceased when the student was charged with, and
pleaded guilty to sexual battery. Id. at 634. In addition, it was claimed that LaShonda was
not the only student to suffer from this student’s sexual conduct, and a group of female
students led by LaShonda attempted to complain directly to Principal Querry about the
student’s conduct. Id. at 635. This group of students was told simply that “‘If Querry
wants you, he’ll call you []’”, and their complaints were not communicated to the Principal.
Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 10, Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363
(M.D. Ga. 1994) (Civ. A. No. 94-140-4-MAC (WDO)). LaShonda claimed that due to the
harassment she was unable to concentrate on her studies and suffered a drop in her
previously-high grades. Id. It was also shown that she had composed a suicide note that
her father discovered. Id.
63
Id. Petitioner alleged that no disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against the
student. Id. Petitioner even contacted Principal Querry to inquire about what steps the
school was planning to take against the student. Id. Principal Querry simply responded
that “‘I guess I’ll have to threaten him a little bit harder.’” Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 12,
Aurelia D v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (Civ. A. No. 94140-4-MAC (WDO)). Neither was any action taken to separate LaShonda from the student,
and she was only allowed to change seats to get away from the student three months after
the harassment began. Id.; see supra, note 34 and accompanying text (for the proposition
that the incidents were repeatedly reported to LaShonda’s teachers and school
supervisors).
64
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. These limited circumstances are ones in which the school
district “exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the
known harassment occurr[ed].” Id. at 645. The Court further stated that a school will be
found deliberately indifferent only where its response, or lack thereof, was clearly
unreasonable under the circumstances then known. Id. at 648. The Court also limited
schools’ responsibility by requiring simply that they “respond to known . . . harassment in
a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.” Id. at 649. Schools were therefore not required
to proactively work to remedy peer harassment or to ensure that students conform their
behavior to certain rules. Id. at 648.
65
Id. at 639 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690–92 (1979) (“There would be
far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead
of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply
as a ban on discriminatory conduct . . . .”)); Id. at 639 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691); Id. at
639–40 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
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the Court focused on its misconduct.66 The Court recognized that
because Title IX had been treated as an exercise of congressional power
under the Spending Clause, private damages were available only where
adequate notice exists to the funding recipients that they may be liable
for the conduct at issue.67 This private right of action echoes previous
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the hostile work environment
standard used in Title VII regulation and jurisprudence and which has
had the effect of creating a hostile educational environment concept
under Title IX.68
To prove a damages claim for student-on-student sexual harassment
under Title IX, a plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment is
“severe, pervasive, and so objectively offensive that it can be said to
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits
provided by the school.”69 A prima facie case for money damages
claiming student-on-student harassment under Title IX involves four
Id. at 641–42. The Court cited Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S.
274 (1998), for the proposition that the focus in a Title IX action claiming damages for
sexual harassment was the intentional misconduct of the federal funding recipient and not
the misconduct of a third party. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42. Gebser involved a claim seeking
monetary damages under Title IX for teacher-on-student sexual harassment. Gebser, 524
U.S. at 277–79. In Gebser, the Court rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability
for a teacher’s misconduct to the school district, and also rejected the use of a negligence
standard (the school district knew or should have known about the misconduct) to hold the
school district liable. Id. at 283.
67
Davis, 526 U.S. at 640 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287, for the proposition that Title IX is
of a contractual nature because it is a manifestation of congressional power under the
Spending Clause, conditioning receipt of federal funds on compliance with the statute;
citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75 for the requirement that there must be adequate notice to
the recipient of federal funds of liability for the conduct at issue before a private damages
action will be available); see infra Part II.D (discussing congressional power under the
Spending Clause).
68
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (clarifying and defining the
hostile workplace environment standard); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986) (formulating the hostile workplace environment standard for Title VII challenges);
see also John E. Matejkovic & David A. Redle, Proceed at Your Own Risk: The Balance between
Academic Freedom and Sexual Harassment, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 295, 309 (2006) (stating that
sexual harassment in the educational context borrows many of the standards and concepts
from Title VII); Susan P. Stuart, Jack and Jill Go to Court: Litigating a Peer Sexual Harassment
Case Under Title IX, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 253 (2006) (stating that in the Davis
decision, Justice O’Connor relied on the Title VII test for same-sex sexual harassment that
the Court had used in a case decided the previous year, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Service, Incorporated, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)); OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2008) (“[T]he Davis Court also indicated, through its specific references to Title VII caselaw,
that Title VII remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX.”).
69
526 U.S. at 650.
66
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elements.70 First, the harassment must be severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive.71 Second, the conduct must deny the victim equal
access to the school’s educational functions.72 Third, the school district
must have actual knowledge of the harassment.73 Finally, the school
district must show deliberate indifference that subjects the victim to the
sexual harassment at issue.74 After Davis, courts have evaluated antiharassment codes designed to protect schools against Title IX liability
according to the requirements of the First Amendment.
b.

Title IX as an Answer to School Harassment Called into Question

The most important of these cases is Saxe v. State College Area School
District, in which the Third Circuit faced a challenge to a public school

70
Stuart, supra note 68, at 251–56. A prima facie case claiming damages for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX requires four elements per Davis: (1) there must be proof of
actionable harassment: conduct that is severe, pervasive and objectively offensive; (2) the
conduct must deny the victim equal access to the federal funding recipient’s educational
opportunities and resources (the author mentions that the Court relied on Title VII hostile
workplace environment precedent to determine if this element was met); (3) the school
district must have “actual knowledge of the peer sexual harassment in an educational
activity”; (4) deliberate indifference on the part of the school district that subjects the
student to sexual harassment or makes him or her liable to be subject or vulnerable to it,
must be shown. Id.
71
Id. at 253–54. Stuart stated that Justice O’Connor relied on a Title VII test for proof of
a hostile working environment as articulated in Oncale, and that using this “the Court
determined that actionable conduct could cover circumstances when the school ‘is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s [educational opportunity] and create an
abusive [school] environment.’” Id. at 253 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78) (changes made in
article). Also, under this standard, the proof of a hostile environment “‘depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.’”
Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
72
Id. at 254 (“[T]he pervasive nature of the harasser’s conduct must be systemic and ‘so
undermine[] and detract[] from the victims’ educational experience, that the victimstudents are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and
opportunities.’”) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651). According to Stuart, the Court relied on
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), and referred to the test used
therein for the proposition that actionable harassment must simply alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive environment. Id.
73
Id. at 255 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–45). Deliberate indifference by the school
district subjects a student to sexual harassment or makes him or her liable to be subject or
vulnerable to it. Id. The school district’s behavior must also be shown to be “clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances,” and the school district must simply
respond in a reasonable manner. Id. at 255–56 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 649).
74
Id. at 254–55 (stating that direct evidence of sexual harassment as well as reports of
harassment to teachers and principals seem sufficient to find the school district to have
actual knowledge).
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district’s anti-harassment policy.75 The court rejected the school district’s
claim that the policy covered only speech already restricted under
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.76 The court also rejected the
school district’s claim that harassment is not protected activity under the
First Amendment.77 The court found the policy unconstitutional because

75
240 F.3d 200 (2001). The challenge was brought by a Pennsylvania State Board of
Education member on behalf of two students from the school district for whom he was
legal guardian. Id. at 203. The suit alleged that the students feared punishment under the
policy for expressing their religious beliefs, which compelled them to speak about moral
issues, including the sinfulness and harmfulness of homosexuality. Id. The District Court
found the policy constitutional because the standard contained in it was similar to those
used to define Title VII and Title IX harassment. Id. at 204. The District Court, as well as
the Third Circuit, found the operable definition of harassment contained in the policy’s
second paragraph as follows:
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s educational
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.
Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
76
Id. at 210. The court determined that the prohibition of harassment based on personal
characteristics was outside the scope of permissible harassment regulation contained in
Title VI and Title IX. Id. The court also found the portion of the policy proscribing
negative comments about a person’s values struck “at the heart of moral and political
discourse—the lifeblood of constitutional self government (and democratic education) and
the core concern of the First Amendment.” Id. According to the court, no court or
legislature has ever even suggested that this type of speech may be prohibited under an
anti-discrimination policy. Id. Also, the policy created liability for speech that has only the
purpose of harassing another, and no effect is required. Id. This focuses on the speaker’s
intent and allows the policy to cover speech that is merely “simple acts of teasing and
name-calling”, which the Court in Davis explicitly held to be insufficient to find liability.
Id. at 210–11 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 652). See Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity
Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment
in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205, 222–23 n.116 (1999) (noting that the majority of Title IX
hostile environment cases that have reached the courts “have included some physical
touching or other conduct in addition to harassing speech”).
77
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204. See id. at 207 (stating that the Supreme Court has not to this date
expressly addressed whether harassment is exempt from First Amendment protection
when it is in the form of pure speech); see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980
P.2d 846, 863 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“No decision by the United States
Supreme Court has, as yet, declared that the First Amendment permits restrictions on
speech creating a hostile work environment . . . .”). But see Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207–09
(discussing that in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Supreme Court
“suggested in dictum that at least some harassing speech does not warrant First
Amendment protection”). The Saxe court did not accept this to mean that all antidiscrimination laws are immune from First Amendment challenge when used to prohibit
speech on the sole basis of the expressive content of the speech. Id.
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it was substantially overbroad and likely to envelop or chill
constitutionally-protected speech.78
The court found that anti-discrimination policies—when applied to
harassment claims based on verbal, pictorial, or literary matter—
imposed “content-based, viewpoint discriminatory restrictions on
speech.”79 This kind of policy is subject to the most exacting First
Amendment standard: strict scrutiny.80 The policy cannot be justified by
recourse to the speech’s secondary effects because the emotive impact of
speech on the audience it reaches is not considered a secondary effect.81
Id. at 217. “A regulation is unconstitutional on its face on over breadth grounds where
there is a ‘likelihood that the statute’s very existence will inhibit free expression’ by
‘inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.’” Id. at 214 (quoting
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)). “To render a
law unconstitutional, the over breadth must be ‘not only real but substantial in relation to
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615 (1973)).
79
Id. at 206 (quoting DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596–
97 (5th Cir. 1995). The court noted that disparaging comments directed at another person’s
sex, race, or other personal characteristic have the potential to create a hostile environment
and therefore fit within the ambit of anti-discrimination laws because of the subject matter
and viewpoint expressed. Id. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve
Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84
GEO. L.J. 399, 433 (1996); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8 (all supporting the proposition
that anti-harassment laws raise the specter of content and viewpoint based discrimination);
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 571–72
(1995). But see Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the First Amendment: Content-Neutral
Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the “Reasonable Person”, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (1998)
(suggesting that Title VII law is based on content neutral principles).
80
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207. After making this statement, the court looked to the opinion in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul in which the Supreme Court found that even a prohibition on
fighting words, which is an unprotected category of speech, is unconstitutional when the
prohibition discriminated on the basis of content and viewpoint. Id. The Court in R.A.V.
concluded that “[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be
expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.” R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992). The Saxe court concluded from this that antiharassment laws may pose some of the same problems that the Court found with the
ordinance in R.A.V. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207. The problem is that the laws may regulate
speech within a category of deeply offensive or potentially disruptive speech, due at least
in part to the speech’s subject matter and viewpoint. Id.
81
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209 (relying on Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), for the
proposition that ideas which society finds offensive or disagreeable are a bedrock principle
of the First Amendment). The court recognized that the Supreme Court has “made it
clear . . . that the government may not prohibit speech under a ‘secondary effects rationale’
based solely on the emotive impact that its offensive content may have on a listener.” Id.
The court then quoted Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1998) (“The emotive impact of
speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect’”) (internal quotations omitted). See also
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“The overriding
justification for the regulation is concern for the effect of the subject matter on
78
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Anti-harassment policies have also been employed in other contexts,
such as Title VII, to avoid liability under congressional statutes that aim
to deter discrimination and harassment.
2.

Title VII and the Hostile Work Environment

In the employment setting, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(“Title VII”) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
an employee because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.82 In the regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to enforce Title VII, the EEOC
established the concept of a hostile environment arising from harassment
in the workplace.83 The seminal hostile work environment case, Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, illustrates the Supreme Court’s adoption of
the hostile work environment concept for purposes of Title VII liability.84
This decision was further clarified and explained by the Court in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.85
a.

The Hostile Workplace Environment as a Framework to Analyze Workplace
Harassment

In Meritor, the Supreme Court confronted important questions
regarding workplace sexual harassment claims under Title VII.86 This
case involved claims by a female employee about sexual harassment by

[listeners]. . . . This is the essence of content-based regulation.”); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209. See
generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (establishing the concept of
“secondary effects” as a permissible reason for which government may establish contentdiscriminatory speech restrictions so long as the restriction is justified with reference to the
effects that come with the speech and not the speech itself).
82
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The full text of the applicable portion of the statute
reads:
(a)Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .
Id.
83
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2010). Under this regulation, conduct that “[h]as the purpose
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment” will lead to liability under Title
VII. Id.
84
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
85
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
86
477 U.S. at 57.
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her male boss.87 The Supreme Court held that a claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment under Title VII is actionable.88 The
Court stated that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in
extending absolute liability to employers for sexual harassment by their
supervisors.89
While the decision in Meritor was limited to a claim of sexual
harassment, it established that a claim for harassment or discrimination
under Title VII may be proven by demonstrating that the harassment or
87
Id. at 60. Meritor involved a claim of sexual harassment occurring over the course of
several years. Id. Plaintiff Vinson alleged that while she had engaged in sexual intercourse
forty to fifty times during this period, she felt compelled to do so out of fear of losing her
job. Id. She also claimed that her boss fondled her in front of other employees, followed
her into the female bathroom, demanded sexual favors both at work and after business
hours, and exposed himself to her. Id. The district court had found that any sexual activity
was voluntary on Vinson’s part, and that she had not been the victim of sexual harassment
or discrimination at work. Id. at 61. They further concluded that even if the sexual activity
had not been voluntary, the bank would not be liable because it had not been put on notice
due to the absence of complaints of sexual harassment against Vinson’s boss. Id. at 62. The
D.C. Circuit court reversed, finding that the question of the voluntariness of Vinson’s
conduct had no effect on the fact that her boss’s conduct had created a hostile environment,
as this concept is formulated in the EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.
Id. at 62–63 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) for the proposition that the EEOC had set out
hostile environment as a type of sexual harassment claim). The Circuit Court also found
that the bank would be liable by interpreting Title VII’s definition of employer and the
guidelines established by the EEOC to mean that an employer is absolutely liable for a
supervisory employee’s sexual harassment, even without notice. Id. at 63.
88
Id. at 73. The Court quoted the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henson v. Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (1982), in which the court stated that “[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile
or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.” Id. at 66–67 (quoting
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903). The Court also recognized that other courts have applied the
hostile environment concept to race, see, e.g., Firefighter’s Inst. for Racial Equality v. St.
Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 515–16 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, sub nom. Banta v. United States, 434
U.S. 819 (1977); religion, see, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio
1976); and national origin, see, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d
87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
89
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Court reasoned that the decision by Congress to define
“employer” to include an “agent” of the employer sets limits on an employer’s liability for
the acts of its employees. Id. While agreeing with the EEOC that Congress had intended
common-law agency principles to guide determinations of employer’s liability for the acts
of its employees, the Court noted that the concepts of common-law agency may not always
be transferrable for Title VII purposes. Id. Because of Congress’s intent to incorporate
agency principles into Title VII to at least some degree, the Court found that the absence of
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate them from liability under Title VII. Id.
But the Court noted that the EEOC suggests that for a sexual harassment claim of hostile
environment under Title VII, actual knowledge is required unless the employee has a
reasonable avenue available to make his or her complaint known to management officials.
Id. at 71. In this case, the Court found Vinson’s failure to initiate a complaint against her
boss through the established grievance procedure did not necessarily insulate the bank
from liability, but declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability. Id. at 72.
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discrimination caused the workplace to become a hostile work
environment.90 In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that for
harassment to be actionable under a hostile work environment theory,
the harassment “[m]ust be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”91 In addition, the Court followed the EEOC’s guidelines
by stating that the existence of harassment must be analyzed by viewing
the totality of the circumstances.92
b.

The Hostile Workplace Environment Clarified

The Supreme Court clarified the standard established in Meritor
seven years later in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.93 In Harris, a female
employee sued her previous employer claiming that the sexual
harassment she suffered at work created an “abusive work
environment” which caused her to quit.94 The Court granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit split concerning whether a Title VII plaintiff claiming an
abusive work environment must prove that his or her psychological
well-being was seriously affected or that he or she suffered an injury.95
Harris reaffirmed the standard established in Meritor, which the
Court characterized as being a middle ground between making merely
offensive conduct actionable, and requiring a tangible psychological

90
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Title VII is violated when harassment is
“[s]ufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment.’” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
91
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
92
Id. at 69. The Court stated that the EEOC guidelines made clear that the “[t]rier of fact
must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of ‘the record as a whole’ and
‘the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context
in which the alleged incidents occurred.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
93
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
94
Id. Plaintiff Teresa Harris claimed that her supervisor, Charles Hardy, sexually
harassed her at work over the course of her employment there. Id. at 19. Harris claimed
that Hardy told her in the presence of other employees, “[Y]ou’re a woman, what do you
know,” and called her “a dumb ass woman.” Id. Harris also claimed that Hardy would
ask her and other female employees to grab coins out of his front pants pocket, throw coins
on the floor and ask them to pick them up, and make sexual innuendos about their
clothing. Id. During Harris’s period of employment, Hardy purportedly made several
other remarks of a sexual nature to Harris in front of other employees. Id. After over two
years of this treatment, Harris quit and sued Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that Hardy’s
conduct created an abusive work environment. Id.
95
Id. at 20. The Court cited Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.
1986) (requiring a serious effect on psychological well being) and Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a requirement of serious effect on psychological well
being), as examples of the opposing viewpoints the Court was attempting to reconcile. Id.
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injury.96 Harris established an objective, reasonable person standard
which requires the conduct to be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable
person would find the environment it creates hostile or abusive.97 Also,
the victim must subjectively perceive the environment created by the
conduct as hostile or abusive.98 In closing, the Court reaffirmed the
totality of the circumstances approach put forth in Meritor as the proper
method to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive.99
The Court stated that while the psychological well-being of the plaintiff
is relevant to whether he or she finds the environment subjectively
hostile or abusive, no single factor is required.100 In response to Title IX
liability, and looking to Title VII for guidance, states have begun to enact
anti-bullying statutes that often center on harassment, a form of
psychological harm that is perpetuated through expression.

Id. at 21. The Court stated that Title VII is violated prior to the harassing conduct
producing a nervous breakdown. Id. at 22. The Court noted that “[a] discriminatorily
abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their
careers.” Id. Also, the Court felt that “the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so
severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace
equality.” Id. In addition, the conduct and especially egregious examples of harassment
found in Meritor did “not mark the boundary of what is actionable.” Id. Title VII does not
require concrete psychological harm and is not limited to conduct that produces such a
result. Id. So long as a workplace environment is found to be hostile or abusive, “there is
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.” Id. But see Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, 31 NOVA L. REV. 225, 225 (2007) (stating that “the
abusiveness that hostile workplace environment cases are required to allege to survive
summary judgment has observably become more extreme, generally speaking”).
97
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment–an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive–is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Id.; see Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81 (1998).
98
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
99
Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The Court recognized that because of the nature of the inquiry,
there was not and could not be a mathematically precise test for making this determination.
Id. at 22.
100
Id. at 23. The Court provided a list of factors that may be used to determine if an
environment is hostile or abusive for purposes of Title VII. Id. These factors include: “the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Id.
96
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C. State Anti-Bullying Legislation
In response to the problems with bullying in public schools, fortyone states have adopted anti-bullying legislation as of April 9, 2010.101
The laws vary in their definitions of bullying and the determination of
what constitutes bullying is often left to the individual school boards102
However, nearly all of the statutes have three common elements:103 (1)
either an identification of who will determine the definition of bullying
or a definition of bullying itself; (2) ways to report bullying; (3) and the
consequences for bullying.104 Some go further, requiring schools to
adopt affirmative measures to prevent bullying.105 The most important
element addressed by these statutes, for the purposes of this Note, is the
definition of bullying.
Definitions of bullying can be characterized in one of two ways.106
One commentator has proposed five categories by focusing on the
content of the definition.107
Two other commentators place the
definitions into three categories based on the definition’s focus to
determine if the conduct is bullying.108 Because the definition of bullying
is the most crucial element of an anti-bullying statute and because it is
the focus of this Note, the approach that focuses on the content of the
definition is the most important for developing a comprehensive antibullying policy.109
Bully Police USA, supra note 4.
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–46 (noting five bases of definitions for anti-bullying
legislation); Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully: Should
Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes be the Answer?, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2005)
(noting most anti-bullying laws do not explicitly define bullying, but defer instead to the
discretion of individual school boards, and that those that do define bullying vary greatly
as to what conduct is subject to the law). Kosse and Wright also believe that the problems
created by these differing standards contribute to the ineffectiveness of state anti-bullying
statutes. Kosse & Wright, supra, at 71.
103
Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62 (stating that nearly all anti-bullying legislation
as of 2005 have three common elements).
104
Id. at 62 (stating that while most statutes differ in how they approach the elements,
nearly all include a definition of bullying or a method for creating one, facilitate the
reporting of bullying, and enumerate the consequences of bullying).
105
Id. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (2008) (requiring schools to adopt “a
specific policy concerning bullying prevention and education”).
106
See Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62–63.
107
Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–46 (proposes that definitions of bullying in anti-bullying
legislation can be tort-based, based on the Tinker substantial disruption standard, on the
creation of a hostile environment, on the fighting words doctrine, or on intent to ridicule).
108
Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62–63 (proposing that most statutes defining
bullying focus on either the intent of the student who is accused of bullying, the reasonable
of the student’s actions, or the effect that the conduct has another student).
109
See supra Part I (setting out the thesis and goals of this Note).
101
102
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The first of these categories includes legislation using a tort-based
definition of bullying.110 Tort-based definitions can be narrow and often
include only intentionally tortious conduct such as assault and battery,
thereby sanctioning only behavior that is already illegal.111
Alternatively, tort-based definitions can be broad and include written,
verbal or physical acts, or the threat of a physical act.112
A second category defines bullying based on the substantial
disruption standard put forth by the Court in Tinker; for instance, New
Jersey’s statute focuses on conduct that causes a disruption within the
school environment.113 While this standard is constitutional because it is
taken directly from a Supreme Court opinion, very few states have used
this standard in their anti-bullying statutes.114 Other statutes focus on a
portion of the Saxe opinion to interpret Tinker as allowing schools to
prohibit speech which “substantially interfere[s] with a student’s
educational performance.”115
Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–37.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2008) (providing that bullying means “[a]ny
willful attempt or threat to inflict injury on another person, when accompanied by an
apparent present ability to do so; or [a]ny intentional display of force such as would give
the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.129
(2006) (defining intimidation as “[a] willful act or course of conduct that is not otherwise
authorized by law and: [I]s highly offensive to a reasonable person; and [p]oses a threat of
immediate harm or actually inflicts harm to another person or to the property of another
person”).
112
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(2)(a) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-2126(a)(2)(i) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(a) (West 2008).
113
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2008), which includes in its definition of
harassment, intimidation or bullying, “[a]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or
any electronic communication . . . that has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student
or group of students in such a way as to cause a substantial disruption in, or substantial
interference with, the orderly operation of the school.” See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1137;
supra note 23 and accompanying text (stating the standard established by Tinker).
114
See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(b), (d), which includes in its
definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying, “intentional electronic, written,
verbal, or physical act[s] [that] . . . [have] the effect of substantially interfering with a
student’s education; or . . . [have] the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly
operation of the school.” But see Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (reasoning that the ambiguity of
the Tinker standard makes its application inconsistent and does not give adequate notice to
students of what conduct is prohibited).
115
Hart, supra note 6, at 217 (finding that because a school’s mission is to educate
students, conduct that interferes with that mission is disruptive to the school environment).
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2) (2007) (prohibiting “any act that substantially interferes
with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance”) (emphasis added). See
also H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004) (including in its definition of both
bullying and harassment conduct that “adversely affects the ability of a student to
participate in or benefit from the school’s educational programs or activities”) (this is a bill
proposed in the House to establish a national bullying and harassment prevention program
by amending the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act).
110
111
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A third category defines bullying in terms of a hostile educational
environment.116
These statutes expand the standard for sexual
harassment established in Davis to include other forms of discrimination
and harassment.117
A fourth category defines bullying based on the “fighting words”
doctrine and has been adopted in only one state.118 New Hampshire’s
anti-bullying statute prohibits “[i]nsults, taunts, or challenges, whether
verbal or physical in nature, which are likely to intimidate or provoke a
violent or disorderly response.”119 Legislation in this category would
most likely be analyzed under Tinker with consideration of the Supreme
Court decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul as well.120
Finally, a fifth defines bullying based on the intent of the alleged
bully.121 Legislation in this category employs the broadest definition of
bullying122 because it focuses on the actor’s mental state and not on the
effect of the behavior.123 For example, Connecticut’s anti-bullying statute
defines bullying as “any overt acts by a student or a group of students
directed against another student with the intent to ridicule, harass,
humiliate or intimidate the other student.”124

Hart, supra note 6 at 1141. Examples include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2008);
FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(2)(b) ; MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2)(c); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-2126(a)(2)(ii); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(c); H.R. 4776(g)(13)(C), 108th Cong.
(not expressly providing the hostile environment language, but suggesting this idea).
117
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). See supra Part II.B.1.a
(discussing Davis, the standard established by it, and the factors for determining if a school
may be held liable under Title IX).
118
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2008). See Hart, supra note 6, at 1144 (stating that New
Hampshire is the only state to adopt anti-bullying legislation relying on the fighting words
doctrine).
119
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3(II)(a) (this statute requires that a report is to be made
by any school employee who witnesses such conduct and that the parents of the victim are
to be notified within forty-eight hours and the decision as to how to remedy the problem is
left to the discretion of the local school board).
120
505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A.V. the Court down an ordinance banning hate speech as an
impermissible content-based restriction of speech by using fighting-words-based-analysis.
Id. See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that this legislation would be analyzed under
Tinker and R.A.V.).
121
See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2008); W. VA. CODE § 18-2c-5 (2008).
122
Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that the focus on the actor’s mental state makes
these anti-bullying statutes the most broad and therefore probably violative of the First
Amendment on over breadth grounds).
123
Id.
124
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d. The definition of bullying in this statute requires
in addition that the bullying take place “on school grounds, at a school-sponsored activity
or on a school bus,” and that the “acts are committed more than once against any student
during the school year.” Id.
116
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State anti-bullying statutes are imposed directly by state legislatures.
The United States Congress has not passed similar legislation, although
the idea has been raised in Congress.125 One way for Congress to pass
anti-bullying legislation is to use its power under the Spending Clause to
condition receipt of federal funds on adopting some type of uniform,
national anti-bullying or anti-harassment policy.
D. Congressional Power under the Spending Clause
Congress is empowered by the Spending Clause to “lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”126
Congress may use this power to place conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.127 Congress has repeatedly exercised this power under the
Spending Clause to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal funds on the recipient’s compliance with federal
statutory and administrative directives.128 Through the Spending
Clause, objectives that are not actionable through exercise of the
enumerated legislative powers of the Constitution can be achieved by
the conditional grant of federal funds.129
This broad spending power is not unlimited and is subject to several
general restrictions.130 Congress’s exercise of the Spending Clause power
can be seen as contractual in nature.131 Thus, the first limitation on
125
H.R. 4776 108th Cong. (2004) (legislation proposed in the House and referred to a
subcommittee, but never voted on or re-proposed).
126
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
127
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Am. Library
Ass’n, Inc., 593 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (same); Davis v. Monroe County Sch. Bd., 526 U.S. 629,
654 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992) (citing to Dole). See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma
v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
128
Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).
See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357
U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
129
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing to United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
130
Id. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13; Steward, 301 U.S. at 585.
131
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions.
The legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
“contract.”
Id.
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Congress’s power under the Spending Clause is that Congress must
exercise the power in pursuit of the “general welfare.”132 The second
limitation is that if Congress conditions the States’ receipt of federal
funds, “it ‘must do so unambiguously, . . . enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.’”133 The next limitation is that conditions on federal funds
will be found illegitimate if they are not related “‘to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs.’”134 There may be an
independent bar on the conditional grant of federal funds from other
constitutional provisions.135
In sum, the Supreme Court has allowed student speech in schools to
be restricted under three separate standards, also known as the three
pillars.136 Congress has the power to condition receipt of federal funds
under the Spending Clause.137 This power could be used to establish a
national anti-bullying or anti-harassment standard to remedy concerns
about the scope and effectiveness of state anti-bullying legislation, but
such a standard would be subject to the limitation of the First
Amendment. National legislation would also establish a uniform
answer to the question of what to do about bullying and harassment in
schools.
III. ANALYSIS
The standards discussed above for regulation of speech have varying
degrees of scope and effectiveness. This Note will now analyze those
standards. Below, Part III.A begins with a discussion of the effectiveness
and scope of the Supreme Court standards for regulating student speech

132
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (also stating that in considering whether a particular expenditure
is in pursuit of the general welfare, substantial deference should be given to the judgment
of Congress). See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at 65;
Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sci., 421 F.3d 342, 348 n.15 (5th Cir. 2005); Benning v.
Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004); Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 318 (4th
Cir. 2002).
133
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); Miller, 421 F.3d at 348 n.15;
Benning, 391 F.3d at 1305; Hodges, 311 F.3d at 318.
134
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295
(1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”).
135
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S.
256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)).
136
Supra Part II.A.
137
Supra Part II.D.
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in an anti-bullying statute.138 Part III.B examines the permissible
regulation of harassing and discriminatory speech under Titles VII and
IX and their possible application to crafting an effective and
constitutional anti-bullying statute.139
Part III.C describes the
effectiveness of state anti-bullying statutes to regulate student speech.140
Finally, Part III.D analyzes the ability of Congress to condition the
receipt of federal funds on schools adopting a nationwide student antibullying statute through Congressional Spending power.141
A. The Effectiveness of Supreme Court Standards for Regulating Student
Speech in an Anti-Bullying Statute
1.

The Ineffectiveness of Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard

The ability of Congress to pass an anti-bullying statute that infringes
expression implicates Tinker and later cases. While expressly upholding
Tinker, the Court in Fraser and Kuhlmeier distinguished Tinker.142 Justice
Black’s dissent suggested that the majority in Tinker did not give schools
enough power to regulate student speech.143 Justice Black’s concerns
seem prophetic when viewing the current status of school
environments.144 This tension is furthered by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fraser.145 The Court in Fraser did not employ the substantial
disruption standard that it had established in Tinker and instead focused

138
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the scope and effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s
opinions in Tinker and Fraser for the purpose of crafting effective and constitutional student
speech regulations; the inapplicability of Kuhlmeier to anti-bullying statutes, and finally, the
impact of R.A.V. and Morse).
139
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the possible application of Title VII “hostile workplace
environment” law to the school environment and the partial integration of this standard
into Title IX’s student-on-student sexual harassment law).
140
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the effectiveness of the different standards employed by
state anti-bullying statutes in accomplishing their goal of reducing harassment and
bullying in public schools).
141
See infra Part III.D (analyzing the ability of Congress to condition receipt of federal
funding on schools adopting a comprehensive student anti-bullying statute).
142
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in Fraser
distinguished Tinker); supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in
Kuhlmeier distinguished Tinker).
143
The record, in Justice Black’s view, “overwhelmingly [showed] that the armbands did
exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the
students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly
emotional subject of the Vietnam war.” Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 518 (1969).
144
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing how Justice Black’s dissent has
been quoted by a majority of the Court in student speech cases after Tinker).
145
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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on the content of the student’s speech.146 The fact that the Court did not
use the substantial disruption standard in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and more
recently, Morse, seemingly reduces Tinker’s scope and application.147
Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that lower courts have been
inconsistent in establishing the requirements under Tinker and its impact
on student speech rights.148 In addition, some lower courts have
required a physical disturbance to find that student speech constitutes a
material and substantial disruption.149 This inconsistency shows that as
applied in lower courts, Tinker is not a uniform standard across the
nation.150 The ambiguity of Tinker does not give definitive guidance with
which school officials can craft a speech regulation or feel confident in
doling out punishment, and other standards established by the Supreme
Court for student speech regulation are no more effective than Tinker in
helping schools discipline students for their speech.

146
See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s departure from
Tinker’s standard in Fraser).
147
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Part II.A.2–3.
148
See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 540. For example, the Fifth Circuit treats Tinker as
simply a case dealing with viewpoint discrimination. Id. See Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch.
Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit applies Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard to student speech that is not considered government or schoolsponsored speech. Mostoller, supra note 39, at 540. See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch.
Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Student speech that ‘happens to occur on the
school premises’ is governed by Tinker . . . .”). The Seventh Circuit states that the Supreme
Court has cast some doubt in its decisions following Tinker as to “the extent to which
students retain free speech rights in the school setting.” Mostoller, supra note 39, at 543
(quoting Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994)). The
Third and Ninth Circuits apply Tinker to a catch-all category of student speech not within
the narrow categories carved out in Fraser and Kuhlmeier. Mostoller, supra note 39, at 539.
See Spyniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Defendants do not contend the Foxworthy shirt contained indecent language; nor was
the shirt school-sponsored. Accordingly, under Saxe, the shirt is subject to Tinker’s general
rule. . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“[S]peech that falls into neither [Fraser’s nor Kuhlmeier’s category] is governed
by Tinker.”). Additionally, the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits use more of an ad hoc
approach to student speech restrictions, allowing a more expansive view of permissible
speech restrictions. Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541.
149
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (stating that emerging from the lower court opinions is
an “overall impression that the substantial disruption standard requires some likelihood of
actual, physical disturbance”). Also, Hart notes that several lower courts have upheld antiharassment codes only “where the circumstances surrounding its adoption indicated a high
likelihood that an identifiable, physical disturbance would result from the prohibited
speech.” Id. Hart also proposes that regulations based on Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
standard likely cover only physical abuse or speech leading to a confrontation. Id.
150
See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text (discussing some of the different views
lower courts have taken in interpreting Tinker).
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Fraser and Kuhlmeier’s Ineffectiveness as Standards for Regulating
Student Speech in an Anti-Bullying Statute and the Impact of
Subsequent Decisions on Anti-Bullying Legislation

Kuhlmeier allows schools to regulate speech if the regulation is
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.151 Only speech
that is or reasonably can be seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school
is subject to this standard.152 But bullying is almost never speech that
can be attributed to the school, and therefore Kuhlmeier is not relevant for
purposes of this Note.153 The Fraser standard, while it has problems, is
more useful for anti-bullying legislation and will therefore be discussed
in more detail.154
The two propositions that the Court promulgated in Fraser are
neither standards nor tests that can be used to regulate student speech.155
Reading Fraser as simply recognizing that Tinker is not an exclusive
standard for student speech, and that students’ constitutional rights are
not the same as those of adults, does nothing to establish a standard
under which schools can regulate student speech.156 These propositions
do not set a definitive standard, nor do they provide guidance to school
officials as to when student speech may be prohibited or punished. The
lack of guidance from Fraser is further evidenced by the conflicting views
of the Court’s holding by the Circuit Courts.157 The Third and Ninth
Circuits view Fraser as permitting school regulation of a category of
lewd, vulgar, obscene, and plainly offensive speech.158 This category of
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258, 273 (1988).
Id.
153
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Kuhlmeier and the narrow scope of its holding).
154
See infra notes 150–62 and accompanying text (analyzing Fraser’s standard for its
effectiveness in an anti-bullying statutes).
155
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).
156
Id. The Court recognized that all that could be definitively taken from the Fraser
decision is that “‘the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings[,]’” and that “the mode of analysis set
forth in Tinker is not absolute.” Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 682 (1986)).
157
See e.g., Mostoller, supra note 39, at 539–43. In an analysis of United States Appellate
Court application of the student speech standards, Mostoller highlights the different
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent. Id.
158
Id. at 539–40. See e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 253
(3d Cir. 2002) (“‘[T]he determination of what manner of speech . . . is inappropriate
properly rests with the school board.’ We have interpreted Fraser as establishing that ‘there
is no First Amendment protection for ‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’
speech in school.’”) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240
F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001)); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“‘[T]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board,’ rather than with the federal
151
152
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speech is then regulated subject to a reasonableness standard that gives
deference to the decisions of school officials.159 Other Circuits have taken
a more expansive approach in interpreting Fraser.
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits read Fraser as
granting more expansive regulatory power to schools in managing
student speech.160 This interpretation of Fraser leads to an ad hoc
approach that allows school administrators to regulate speech as
teachers of “habits and manners of civility.”161 A possible consequence
of this interpretation is that Fraser allows schools to create a speech code
that is in effect a general civility code regulating manners and interaction
among students.162 Adding to this variety in interpretation of Fraser, the
Fourth Circuit rejects the above approach and interprets Fraser as limited
to school-sponsored speech as in Kuhlmeier.163
The ambiguity of Fraser lessens the effect it can have for regulating
student speech pursuant to an anti-bullying statute. The fact that the
Court has questioned the clarity of its own decision and analysis causes
courts[;] . . . vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser . . . .”
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258, 267 (1988)).
159
See supra note 154 and accompanying text (looking at the Third and Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ view of Fraser).
160
See e.g., Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the teaching of civility and the
inculcation of tradition moral, social, and political norms may override student expression,
or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order its educational priorities.”)
(citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271–72)); Lacks v. Ferguson
Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998) (“students’ First Amendment
rights ‘in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior’” (quoting
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)); Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1536
(7th Cir. 1996) (“‘Public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . .
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility[;] . . . [t]hese ‘habits and manners of
civility’ must ‘take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case
of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.’” (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)); Poling v.
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Local school officials . . . must obviously be
accorded wide latitude in choosing which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in
choosing the means through which those values are to be promoted.”).
161
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541–42.
162
Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541–42.
163
See Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) (reading Fraser along with
Kuhlmeier to stand for the proposition that “school officials need not sponsor or promote all
student speech”). See also Mostoller, supra note 39, at 542 (“This interpretation is contrary
to the view that school sponsorship is central to the Fraser holding, and that the more
flexible standard in Fraser and Hazelwood stems from a school’s interest in suppressing
student expression only when such expression could be perceived as school-endorsed.”);
Jonathan Pyle, Note, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 586, 633 (2002) (“[A]lthough many courts have interpreted Fraser to carve out an
exception to the Tinker disruption standard for vulgar speech in any context, the Hazelwood
case clarified Fraser’s holding, confining it to the school-sponsored context.”).
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further confusion over this opinion and its precedential value.164 Thus, it
seems schools may regulate lewd or vulgar speech under Fraser, but the
questionable scope of this general rule and its inherent vagueness gives
no guidance to school officials and opens regulations to challenges under
the void for vagueness standard.165 Additionally, the lack of clear factors
and reasoning in Fraser make it hard to discern how to regulate bullying
without overbreadth problems.166 Lower federal courts have done
nothing to crystallize Fraser’s holding and have only added to the
divergent, conflicting interpretations of the opinion.167
Two later cases have possible impact on to the ability to effectively
craft anti-bullying statutes.168 First, R.A.V. seems to disallow any
regulation of expression that is content-based.169 That the Supreme
Court did not look to R.A.V. in either Davis or Morse suggests that either
the Court does not deem R.A.V. applicable to the school setting or that
R.A.V.’s precedential value is minimal in that context.170 Morse can be
and has been interpreted as creating a standard by which a school can
prohibit only expression that advocates illegal drug use.171 Because
bullying behavior is not advocacy of illegal drug use, Morse is not useful
for crafting an anti-bullying statute.
In sum, the standards for permissible regulation of student speech
established by the Supreme Court have inherent problems preventing
them from being fully and clearly applicable to student bullying

164
See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (stating that the mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not
entirely clear).
165
Snook, supra note 27, at 672 (noting that a regulation based on the Fraser standard may
be found “unconstitutional if it is written in such vague terms as to not adequately give
students notice of speech that is prohibited”).
166
See id. at 673 (stating that a regulation based on Fraser “could lend itself to a
substantial number of impermissible applications; . . . the regulation may deter protected
expression, and school officials would have to enforce it in a way that avoids such
unconstitutional application”).
167
See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text (looking at the Circuit Courts’ differing
views of Fraser’s holding).
168
See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing the possible ramifications of
R.A.V. for anti-bullying legislation and the possible new standard arising in Morse).
169
See supra note 50 and accompanying text (setting out the requirement of contentneutrality set by R.A.V.).
170
See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Davis, which does not cite R.A.V.); supra notes 53–56
(discussing Morse, the Court’s latest student speech case, which also does not cite R.A.V. a
single time).
171
See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that while the true impact of Morse
on student speech rights is unclear at this time, many commentators conclude it creates a
narrow standard allowing for regulation of student expression advocating illegal drug use;
citing two of many articles articulating this point).
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regulations.172 The opinions provide abundant, oft-quoted language that
can justify certain speech codes or regulations.173 However, there is
significant ambiguity in Tinker and Fraser, and many questions
pertaining to their import and scope as applied to student speech.174
B. The Effectiveness of Congressional Regulations on Harassing or
Discriminatory Speech
1.

Effectiveness of Title IX for Regulating Student Speech

Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any educational
program or activity that receives federal funding.175 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education established
a private right of action for victims of student-on-student sexual
harassment under Title IX.176 This decision has motivated schools to take
affirmative steps to prevent student-on-student sexual harassment.177
In Davis, the Supreme Court cited examples of conduct that would
not give rise to liability under Title IX.178 These examples illustrate the
high burden of proof required to prove a claim of student-on-student
sexual harassment.179 In addition, it has proven difficult to meet the
“severe and pervasive” standard established in Fraser.180 The Court
further limited its holding by distinguishing Title IX law from Title VII
law because of the difference in the age and maturity of the protected

172
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the efficacy of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tinker,
Fraser, and Kuhlmeier for regulating student speech in an anti-bullying statute).
173
See supra Part II.A (setting out and discussing the “three pillars” of Supreme Court
student speech jurisprudence: Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, and the major standards they
established).
174
See supra Parts III.A.1–2 (discussing the effectiveness and problems of using Tinker and
Fraser as standards for regulating student speech through an anti-bullying statute).
175
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
176
See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999)).
177
See e.g., Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 305–06 (“Courts have regularly held that Title IX
imposes duties on educational institutions to prevent sexual harassment of students in the
same fashion that Title VII imposes duties on employers to prevent sexual harassment of
employees.”).
178
Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. The Court took for granted that “students often engage in
insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to
the students subjected to it.” Id. at 651–52. The Court next stated that “[d]amages are not
available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even
where these comments target differences in gender.” Id. at 652. Thus, the Court decided
that these acts would not give rise to a Title IX action. Mostoller, supra note 39, at 545–46.
179
See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 545–46.
180
See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547 (noting that “lower courts have required relatively
extreme behavior to satisfy the severe and pervasive standard”).
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classes, lessening the scope of its opinion and raising questions as to the
viability of the standard for older students.181
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits addressed extreme and egregious
conduct in school by finding peer sexual harassment actionable under
Title IX.182 Federal district courts have not considered verbal harassment
alone as satisfying Davis’s severe and pervasive standard.183 Therefore,
extreme and egregious behavior is required to trigger a violation of Title
IX.184 In Saxe, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals restricted the ability of
schools to limit their own liability under Title IX by applying the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine to a school anti-harassment policy.185
While these limitations lessen schools’ potential liability under Title
IX, regulations promulgated under Title IX can be used to fashion a
student anti-bullying statute because Title IX has been tested before the
Court.186 However, because verbal harassment alone does not trigger
liability, schools likely will not be motivated to restrict student speech
that is viewed as simply teasing, even though it is often the most
damaging verbal harassment. The Court has also pointed out that, while
Title IX law has been fashioned with an eye to Title VII, the difference in
age and maturity of the protected classes affords less protection to
students.187 Thus, Title IX law does not reach all the types of bullying
that are harmful to young children and that can lead to physical
confrontation.188 Additionally, the relationship between Title IX law on
181
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651–52. The Court stated that courts “must bear in mind that
schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly interact in a
manner that would be unacceptable among adults.” Id. at 651. The Court also observed
that “at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their
peers. It is thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often engage in insults,
banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the
students subjected to it.” Id. at 651–52.
182
Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547.
183
Hart, supra note 6, at 1143 (noting that “lower courts interpreting the Davis standard
have so far required physical conduct to hold schools liable under Davis; in some cases,
they have dismissed claims because they involved only verbal abuse”); Mostoller, supra
note 39, at 547–48.
184
See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 548 (stating that “lower courts have interpreted the
severe and pervasive standard to require extreme behavior that must include some
physical conduct beyond verbal harassment”).
185
Id. at 217.
186
See supra notes 107–09 (introducing the category of state anti-bullying statutes that
employ the hostile environment standard, established by the Supreme Court in Davis, as
the standard for analyzing Title IX claims).
187
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1143 (stating that “the Davis standard gives children less legal
protection in school than adults receive in the workplace under Title VII,” and that the
Court has acknowledged and accepted this fact).
188
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing types of bullying other than
physical abuse that can lead to violence and psychological damage).
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sexual harassment and First Amendment freedom of speech remains
unclear.189 Therefore, the extent to which sexually harassing speech can
be regulated under the First Amendment is unclear. But at least it can be
said that sexually harassing speech can be prohibited in schools to
protect students, which is all that is required for the purpose of crafting
an anti-bullying statute. Standards for other types of harassing speech
may also be effective in prohibiting bullying in schools.
2.

The Possible Applicability of Title VII Standards to the School
Setting

The Supreme Court based part of its opinion in Davis on previous
decisions about the workplace context under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.190 In addition, the Court invoked Title VII precedent in
formulating its test for Title IX liability.191 At the same time, the Davis
Court expressly stated that speech and conduct actionable under Title
VII when performed by adults would not be actionable under Title IX if
performed by children.192 Therefore, the Supreme Court has indicated
that children who are being bullied in school have less protection under
Title IX than adults who are harassed in the workplace under Title VII.193
Title VII law has been used as guidance by the Court in fashioning
its Title IX jurisprudence and has been used by the Office of Civil Rights
to provide guidance to schools complying with Title IX.194 This concept
189
See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 556–59. There are three possibilities Mostoller
describes:
(A) there is a discrete point at which First Amendment protections end
and impermissible harassment begins; (B) there is a gap between the
two standards where school officials may suppress speech that falls
short of harassment and still avoid liability for First Amendment
violations; or (C) the two standards overlap, leaving schools helpless to
regulate expression that is both protected by the First Amendment and
triggers liability under Title IX.
Id. at 556–57 (the author believes that choice (B) is the proper state of the law at this time
and that the gap between the two standards might be quite wide judging from precedent).
190
See Stuart, supra note 68, at 253 (stating that in Davis, the Court looked to Title VII law
in developing the hostile education environment and that the Department of education did
the same when crafting regulations under Title IX); Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 309 (same).
191
See Stuart, supra note 68, at 253–54. See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998) (dealing with a Title VII claim; this case was decided the year before
Davis and Justice O’Connor quoted and cited liberally to it in her majority opinion in
Davis).
192
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999).
193
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1143.
194
See Stuart, supra note 68, at 254 (“Clearly, Justice O’Connor relied on Title VII’s hostile
work environment test in establishing whether a student has been discriminated against in
her access to the educational program.”). See also Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 309 (stating
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goes beyond Title IX regulation in prohibiting harassment or
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.195
Title VII has at least two distinct advantages over Title IX in the
context of student speech regulation. First, Title VII’s hostile workplace
environment regulation is not limited to discrimination or harassment
based on sex.196 Second, Title VII has a well-established, thorough, and
constitutional framework and regulatory system already in place.197 The
standard of proof is still high, but this has not discouraged the
promulgation of an entire regulatory scheme.198 Although the Court
would have to revise part of the precedent set in Davis, Title VII and the
regulations promulgated under it by the EEOC could be used to fashion
a student anti-bullying statute that would reach much of the speech
associated with bullying. Such a statute would give students the same
protection against harassment and discrimination that adults enjoy in the
workplace, and would reach bullying that is not merely sexual in nature.
C. The Effectiveness of State Anti-Bullying Legislation
State Anti-Bullying legislation, created as a bulwark against Title IX
liability and the ongoing problem of bullying, offers different definitions
of “bullying” and has varying levels of effectiveness.199 The first
category as described above includes legislation employing a tort-based
definition of bullying.200 While this legislation may be constitutional, it
does not reach verbal and psychological bullying and therefore
implicates only a small percentage of bullying incidents.201

that concepts and standards from Title VII jurisprudence have been borrowed to provide
proof of sexual harassment or discrimination in the school environment under Title IX);
DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 70
(2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (“[T]he Davis
Court also indicated, through its specific references to Title VII caselaw, that Title VII
remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title IX.”).
195
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
196
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (setting out the different types of
discrimination that Title VII prohibits).
197
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Title VII law and introducing the EEOC Guidelines as
adopted by the Supreme Court in its decisions).
198
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (defining the specific standard set by the
Court in Meritor for establishing a prima facie claim under Title VII).
199
See supra Part II.C (discussing the various approaches different states have taken in
fashioning anti-bullying legislation).
200
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1137; supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (introducing
state anti-bullying statutes that use a tort-based definition of bullying).
201
Hart, supra note 6, at 1136–37.
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The second category contains definitions based on the substantial
disruption standard proffered by Tinker.202 While this standard is
constitutional because it is taken directly from Tinker, few states use this
standard in their anti-bullying statutes.203 The effectiveness of this
definition for anti-bullying statutes is diminished by the uncertainty over
the continued viability, scope, and application of Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard.204 Tinker’s standard is also ineffective in preventing
much of the bullying that occurs in school without a prior history or the
likelihood of an actual, physical disturbance.205 Other statutes have
seized on a portion of the Saxe opinion to interpret Tinker as allowing
schools to prohibit speech that “substantially interfere[s] with a student’s
educational performance.”206 This is an improvement on definitions

202
Id. at 1137. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (introducing anti-bullying
statutes that employ a definition of bullying based on Tinker).
203
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Tinker opinion and standard). But see Hart, supra
note 6, at 1139 (reasoning that the ambiguity surrounding the Tinker standard makes its
application inconsistent and does not give adequate notice to students of what conduct is
prohibited).
204
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417–18 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(Justice Thomas concurs in the opinion because he feels it “creates another exception [to
Tinker and] [i]n doing so, we continue to distance ourselves from Tinker”). He also states
that Morse “erodes Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech, even though it does so by
adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker standard. I think the better approach is
to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.” Id. at 422.
See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that it is
not clear whether Tinker applies to all non-school sponsored student speech, only political
speech, or only political viewpoint-based discrimination, “[n]or is Tinker entirely clear as to
what constitutes ‘substantial disorder’ or ‘substantial disruption’ of or ‘material
interference’ with school activities” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969))); Strossen, supra note 22, at 458–59, (“Unfortunately, Tinker was
in many ways a high-water mark for students’ rights, and we have seen some sad backsliding in Supreme Court decisions about students’ rights since then . . . the Supreme Court
has tended to look less favorably on constitutional rights and civil liberties.”).
205
Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (pointing out that lower courts have often required an antiharassment code to be accompanied by “a high likelihood that an identifiable, physical
disturbance would result from the prohibited speech”). See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch.
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206
F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) in support of the proposition that, under Tinker, “if a school can
point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on past incidents
arising out of similar speech—the restriction [on student speech] may pass constitutional
muster”).
206
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217 (finding that because a school’s mission is to educate students,
conduct that interferes with that mission is disruptive to the school environment). See, e.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2) (2007) (prohibiting any act that “[s]ubstantially interferes with a
student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance”) (emphasis added). See also
H.R. 4776, 108th Cong. (2004) (bill proposed in the House to establish a national bullying
and harassment prevention program by amending the Safe and Drug Free Schools and
Communities Act). The bill included in its definition of both bullying and harassment
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employing the Tinker standard, but it is not wholly adequate to curtail
bullying in schools.
The third category of anti-bullying legislation includes statutes that
attempt to define bullying in terms of a hostile educational
environment.207 These statutes expand the standard established in Davis
for sexual harassment to include other forms of discrimination and
harassment.208 Saxe gives reason to doubt whether anti-bullying statutes
using the hostile or abusive educational environment definition can
withstand judicial scrutiny.209 Also, lower courts’ treatment of Davis
indicates that verbal abuse alone is not enough without some physical
conduct.210
The fourth category of legislation bases its definition of bullying on
the fighting words doctrine.211 Because this standard focuses on the
effects that words have on their listeners, it would most likely be found
unconstitutional under R.A.V. because the emotive impact on listeners is
outside the scope of the fighting words doctrine.212 In addition, appellate
courts have typically required a finding of physical disruption in
addition to mere offense to words before the Tinker standard can be
met.213 By the time the “fighting words” doctrine or Tinker come into
play due to substantial, often physical disruption, this sort of legislation
has already failed to curtail bullying.214
conduct that “adversely affects the ability of a student to participate in or benefit from the
school’s educational programs or activities.” Id.
207
Hart, supra note 6, at 1141. See also supra note 107–09 and accompanying text
(describing hostile educational environment based anti-bullying legislation).
208
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
209
See supra Part II.B.1.b.
210
Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547 (stating that of the Federal District Courts that had
examined the severe and pervasive standard of Davis, none had at that point found verbal
harassment alone to be enough to satisfy the standard). See generally Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch.
Dist., 2002 WL 1592694 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Johnson v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d
939 (D. Minn. 2002); Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917 (C.D.
Ill. 2002); Benjamin v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Township, 2002 WL 977661 (S.D. Ind.
2002); Wilson v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Manfredi v.
Mount Vernon Bd. of Ed., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Kindred, supra note 76 (noting
that the majority of Title IX hostile environment cases that have been before the courts
“have included some physical touching or other conduct in addition to harassing speech”).
211
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145–46; supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text
(introducing anti-bullying legislation that uses a fighting-words-based definition of
bullying).
212
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992).
213
See supra notes 142–43 (discussing the different views lower Federal courts have as to
what is required to meet the Tinker standard).
214
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that the “limit [to words that cause more than
psychological or emotive impact] likely precludes use of the fighting words doctrine as a
vehicle for any meaningful restriction of harassing or abusive speech”).
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The fifth category includes legislation with intent-based definitions
of bullying.215 While these definitions would be very successful in
identifying bullying, they also would likely be found unconstitutional.216
In addition, because the focus is on the speaker’s intent, it would be hard
to demonstrate a substantial disruption or violation of another standard
because the effect on the listener is not considered.217 Unfortunately,
these anti-bullying statutes reach the most verbal and psychological
bullying.218
Thus, the effectiveness and constitutionality of state anti-bullying
legislation have not been evaluated, but are problematic, as the
preceding section explained.219 That this legislation has been introduced
and passed is a good sign that the problem of bullying is recognized and
that attempts are being made to remedy it. Also, certain elements of
some of these statutes could be used in fashioning a national standard.220
Congress could use its power under the Spending Clause to enact antibullying legislation and set a national standard to prevent bullying in
schools.
D. Congressional Spending Clause Power Used to Remedy the Differing
Standards
The Spending Clause allows Congress broad power to accomplish
objectives that are not within its enumerated legislative powers, by
conditioning receipt of federal funds on adoption of Congressional
legislation.221 The Supreme Court views exercise of this power as
contractual in nature.222 A national student anti-bullying statute enacted
through Congressional spending power would need to comply with
these limitations imposed by the Constitution and Supreme Court
decisions.223

215
See id. at 1145–46; supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (introducing antibullying statutes that use an intent-based definition of bullying).
216
See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145–46.
217
Id. at 1146.
218
Id.
219
See id. (“constitutional antibullying and antiharassment statutes are largely ineffective
in dealing with the verbal and psychological bullying that can lead to more deadly school
violence”).
220
See infra Part IV.B (proposing a model statute containing some of these elements).
221
See Part II.D (discussing Congressional power under the Spending Clause generally).
222
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
223
See supra notes 120–23 (discussing generally the limitations on Congressional
Spending Clause power).
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The first requirement, that the spending power must be exercised in
pursuit of the “general welfare,” would be met by such legislation.224
Attempting to prevent bullying and harassment of school children is
within the category of the “general welfare.” The second limitation,
requiring Congress to exercise its power unambiguously and give clear
notice and a voluntary choice to the States, would also be met.225 A clear
mandate that States must institute an anti-bullying statute crafted by
Congress upon receipt of federal funds, would certainly be
unambiguous and give clear notice. If a uniform anti-bullying statute is
proposed and passed by Congress, the States would have adequate
notice of the policy they are accepting. The third limitation requires that
the conditions imposed are related to federal interest in a national project
or program; this too would be satisfied.226 Providing a safe and effective
learning environment in schools and educational programs is one of the
utmost federal interests as schools prepare children to be good and
productive citizens and reach their full potential.227
The final limitation is that there may be an independent
constitutional bar on the conditional grant of federal funds.228 This
limitation would be the most problematic and potentially fatal to a
national anti-bullying statute because such a statute would involve
restricting free speech rights in schools and would directly confront the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court could possibly find that the
condition created by national anti-bullying legislation is unconstitutional
because it violates the First Amendment by prohibiting students’
constitutionally-protected speech. To avoid this result, the Supreme
See e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (stating that in considering
whether a particular expenditure is in pursuit of the general welfare, substantial deference
should be given to the judgment of Congress); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41
(1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health
Sciences, 421 F.3d 342, 348 n.15 (5th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305
(11th Cir. 2004); Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (all affirming that
the Spending power must be exercised in pursuit of the “general welfare”).
225
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); Miller, 421 F.3d at 348 n.15;
Benning, 391 F.3d at 1305; Hodges, 311 F.3d at 318. If Congress conditions States’ receipt of
federal funds, “it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’” Dole, 483 U.S. at
207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).
226
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295
(1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”).
227
See e.g. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
228
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing to Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469
U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)).
224
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Court would need to be more flexible with its First Amendment
jurisprudence to provide greater protection to students in schools. The
education of America’s youth is extremely important to the future of this
country and the next generation of Americans.
IV. AN ANSWER TO BULLYING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Despite continued worries about bullying and its consequences in
U.S. public schools, some states still do not have any form of antibullying legislation in place.229 The effectiveness of current state antibullying legislation is uncertain but could be greatly enhanced.230 This
Part will discuss the advantages in reducing bullying and its effects that
a national statute could provide. A model anti-bullying statute based on
existing state anti-bullying statutes and Supreme Court precedent will be
suggested and discussed. The model anti-bullying statute proposed in
this Part results from compiling sections of current state anti-bullying
legislation and then enhances these sections to effectively accomplish the
aims of anti-bullying legislation in a constitutional manner. A national
anti-bullying statute would provide advantages unavailable through the
myriad of state statutes that are currently in force.
A. Advantages of a Single, National Standard for Anti-Bullying Legislation
A national anti-bullying statute could be tested a single time in front
of the nation’s courts. This eliminates the need for continual challenges
to student anti-bullying statutes and anti-bullying legislation and for
federal courts to interpret the scope and effect of Supreme Court
precedent. In trying to protect their students from bullying and its
effects, schools have struggled to determine what speech and expression
they may constitutionally prohibit. A national standard, once challenged
and tested in front of the courts, would provide a definitive answer to
this problem. The uniform national standard would also increase the
effectiveness of enforcement because all schools would adhere to the
same definitions of bullying, prohibited speech and conduct.
In order to accomplish these aims, Congress should condition
disbursement of federal education funds on acceptance of this national
anti-bullying statute, similar to what Congress has already done with
Title IX.231 This will cause schools and school districts across the nation
229
See supra Part II.D (introducing the different forms state anti-bullying legislation has
taken and acknowledging that fourteen states still have no anti-bullying legislation).
230
See supra Part III.C (discussing the effectiveness of current state anti-bullying
legislation in reducing bullying and its negative effects in schools).
231
See supra Part II.B (discussing Title IX law).
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to adopt this anti-bullying code. An anti-bullying statute passed
pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power is contractual in nature
and requires Congress to speak with a clear voice.232 These requirements
would be satisfied by the type of legislation proposed in this Note.
B. Components of an Effective and Constitutional Anti-Bullying Statute
An effective anti-bullying statute must include the substantial,
material disruption standard established in Tinker.233 This standard is
likely constitutional due to its creation and repeated affirmation by the
Supreme Court.234 The Tinker standard allows anti-bullying statutes to
encompass disruptive behavior targeted at a student but which may not
be prohibited by the other standards set out in this Part.235 The other two
major Supreme Court student speech cases, Fraser and Kuhlmeier, are not
really applicable to anti-bullying statutes because Fraser’s standard is
unclear and Kuhlmeier’s deals with school-sponsored speech.236 Title IX
offers an existing framework and regulatory scheme for proscribing
harassment based on sex in public schools and has passed the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment requirements. This legislative prohibition of
harassment is important as it allows bullying or harassment based on sex
to be prohibited by the legislation this Note proposes. In addition, the
hostile environment jurisprudence and hostile workplace environment
standard that Title IX adopts from Title VII law are helpful in crafting a
comprehensive anti-bullying statute.237 By analogizing Title VII
workplace jurisprudence to the school environment, Title VII’s
prohibitions against discrimination based on race, color, religion, and
national origin can be used to protect students against bullying based on
these factors.238
In addition, because of the fragile psyches of adolescents and
children, other characteristics of these individuals, such as physical
attributes or socioeconomic status, should be included to make the
See supra Part II.D (discussing the nature of legislation passed by Congress pursuant
to its Spending Clause power).
233
See supra Part II.A.1 (examining the facts and reasoning of Tinker and the precedents it
established, including the substantial, material disruption standard).
234
See supra Part II.A.1–3 (discussing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier and recognizing that
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Tinker’s substantial, material disruption standard in both
Fraser and Kuhlmeier).
235
See infra Part IV.C (proposing a model anti-bullying statute).
236
See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the effectiveness of Fraser and Kuhlmeier as standards
for prohibiting speech through an anti-bullying statute).
237
See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the Title IX and Title VII hostile environment
standard).
238
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
232
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statute truly effective. While no Supreme Court precedent or federal
statutory provision includes these other characteristics, many state antibullying statutes do include these characteristics.
For these
characteristics to be included constitutionally in a federal statute, the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, would need to recognize and
allow for the peculiar and special circumstances in and around the
school environment. To avoid the over breadth and vagueness problems
that invalidate much legislation when First Amendment challenges are
brought, these characteristics must be specifically included. Also,
Spending Clause legislation must be precise to give states clear notice so
that they may knowingly exercise their choice to adopt it.
C. Model Federal Anti-Bullying Statute
This Model Statute borrows the best portions from the most
strongly-drafted state anti-bullying legislation. To start, anti-bullying
legislation should give a clear purpose statement with strong legislative
findings, as New Jersey’s anti-bullying statute does. Next, the bullying
and harassment to be prohibited by the statute needs to be clearly and
unambiguously defined. Maryland’s anti-bullying statute does this
thoroughly and concisely. The applicability of the statute to school
activities must also be stated. Delaware’s anti-bullying statute does this
well
Also, legislation should provide for a robust system for reporting
incidents of bullying and providing immunity to the person reporting an
incident. Maryland’s statute provides for a detailed and comprehensive
reporting system. Florida’s statute sets out an immunity provision in a
clear, concise manner. The policy should include a requirement that
anti-bullying training and education be provided to both students and
school staff; West Virginia’s statute does this particularly well. Finally,
legislation should include a process for handling bullying incidents, as
does Florida’s statute.
This Note’s proposed Model Statute follows:239
(A) The Legislature Congress finds and declares that: a
safe and civil environment in school is necessary for
students to learn and achieve high academic
standards; harassment, intimidation or bullying, like
other disruptive or violent behaviors, is conduct that
disrupts both a student’s ability to learn and a
239
This proposed statute is composed of language drawn from various state antibullying statutes; this unique compilation is the contribution of the author. Additions to
language found in state statutes are italicized.
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school’s ability to educate its students in a safe
environment, free from fear and potential violence; and
since students learn by example, school
administrators, faculty, staff, and volunteers should
be commended for demonstrating appropriate
behavior, treating others with civility and respect,
and refusing to tolerate harassment, intimidation or
bullying.240
(B) “Bullying, harassment, or intimidation” means
intentional conduct, including verbal, physical, or
written conduct, or an intentional electronic
communication, that:
(1) Creates a hostile educational environment by
substantially interfering with a student's
educational
benefits,
opportunities,
or
performance, or with a student’s physical or
psychological well-being and is:
a. Motivated by an actual or a perceived personal
characteristic including race, national origin, marital
status, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity,
religion, ancestry, physical attribute, socioeconomic
status, familial status, or physical or mental ability
or disability; or
b. Threatening or seriously intimidating;
(ii) 1. Occurs on school property, at a school activity
or event, or on a school bus; or
2. Or Ssubstantially disrupts the orderly operation
of a school.241
(C) A statement prohibiting bullying Bullying,
harassment, or intimidation of any person on school
property or at school functions or by use of data or
computer software that is accessed through a
computer, computer system, computer network or
other electronic technology of a school district or
charter school from kindergarten through grade 12
shall be prohibited by this statute.242
(D) The State Department of Education shall require a
county board or other school administrative body to
report incidents of bullying, harassment, or

240
241
242

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13 (West 2008).
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D(b)(2)(a) (2008).
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intimidation against students attending a public
school under the jurisdiction:
(1) An incident of bullying, harassment, or
intimidation may be reported openly or anonymously
by:
(a) A student;
(b) The parent, guardian, or close adult relative
of a student; or
(c) A school staff member.
(2) The Department shall require a county board to
report incidents of bullying, harassment, or
intimidation against students attending a public
school under the jurisdiction of the county board.
(3) Each victim of bullying, harassment, or
intimidation report form shall:
(a) Identify the victim and the alleged
perpetrator, if known;
(b) Indicate the age of the victim and alleged
perpetrator;
(c) Describe the incident, including alleged
statements made by the alleged perpetrator;
(d) Indicate the location of the incident;
(e) Identify any physical injury suffered by the
victim and describe the seriousness and any
permanent effects of the injury;
(f) Indicate the number of days a student is
absent from school, if any, as a result of the
incident;
(g) Identify any request for psychological
services initiated by the victim or the victim's
family due to psychological injuries suffered;
and
(h) Include instructions on how to fill out the
form and the mailing address to where the form
shall be sent.
(4) A county board shall distribute copies of the
victim of bullying, harassment, or intimidation
report form to each public school under the county
board's jurisdiction.
(5) Each county board shall submit summaries of
report forms filed with the county board to the State
Board on or before January 31 each year.
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(6) A county board shall delete any information that
identifies an individual.
(7) The information contained in a victim of
bullying, harassment, or intimidation report form in
accordance with subsection (3) of this section:
(a) Is confidential and may not be disclosed again
except as otherwise provided under the Family
Education Rights and Privacy Act or this section
when deemed necessary by the school or county board
to protect the students involved, or other students;
and
(b) May not be made a part of a student’s
permanent educational record.243
(8) A school employee, school volunteer, student, or
parent who promptly reports in good faith an act of
bullying or harassment to the appropriate school official
designated in the school district's policy and who makes
this report in compliance with the procedures set forth in
the policy is immune from a cause of action for damages
arising out of the reporting itself or any failure to remedy
the reported incident.244
(9) To the extent state or federal funds are
appropriated for the purposes of this statute, each
school district shall:
(a) Provide training on the harassment,
intimidation or bullying policy to school
employees and volunteers who have direct
contact with students; and
(b) Develop a process for educating students on
the harassment, intimidation or bullying policy.
(c) Information regarding the county board
policy against harassment, intimidation or
bullying shall be incorporated into each school’s
current employee training program.
(10) For use in the event of a properly reported incident
according to the provisions of this statute, state, school, or
county boards shall establish:
(a) A procedure for providing immediate
notification to the parents of a victim of bullying
or harassment and the parents of the perpetrator

243
244

MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2008).
W. VA. CODE § 18-2c-4 (2008).
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of an act of bullying or harassment, as well as
notification to all local agencies where criminal
charges may be pursued against the perpetrator.
(b) A procedure to refer victims and
perpetrators of bullying or harassment for
counseling.
(c) A procedure for regularly reporting to a
victim’s parents the actions taken to protect the
victim.245
D. Commentary on the Proposed Model Statute
This proposed Model Statute incorporates sections from the bestdrafted state anti-bullying statutes currently in force. In each section, the
language was enhanced to cover all the different types of bullying in a
constitutional way.
Harassment, as defined by Title VII and Title IX, informs the central
definition of bullying in this proposed Model Statute. The Supreme
Court has found each of these statutes constitutional when challenged.
In the school environment, prohibiting harassment based on sex is
constitutional under Title IX. Title VII has been found constitutional
only in the workplace environment. Nonetheless, students deserve at
least as much protection from bullying and harassment in school as
adults do in the workplace. Providing students protection from bullying
and harassment is only fair and no greater infringement than restrictions
on workplace adult speech that have been found constitutional under
Title VII.
While R.A.V. seems to require strict scrutiny of any speech
regulation that is content-based or establishes categories of speech, the
special circumstances of the school environment require a different
approach; the fact that the Court has not used R.A.V. in its subsequent
student speech cases, such as Davis and Morse, is instructive. It indicates
that R.A.V. and its requirement of strict scrutiny will not be used by the
Court to evaluate regulations of student speech in the school
environment. The proposed model statute avoids vagueness problems
because it grants no discretion to school officials to sanction speech that
is not described in the statute.
The proposed Model Statute would reach all types of bullying, but
its constitutionality would likely be challenged in the courts. If the
Supreme Court was to face a challenge of this proposed statute, it would
need to recognize that while students have First Amendment rights, the
245
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school environment is special. Peculiar circumstances inherent in the
school environment require allowing schools to take measures to prevent
the potentially tragic consequences of bullying and to foster a better
educational environment for the youth of America. This national
standard could be tested a single time to provide a definitive answer as
to what conduct schools may prohibit to combat bullying.
V. CONCLUSION
School bullying and harassment have resulted in violence and
allowed an environment detrimental to learning to persist in public
schools. While protecting freedom of speech and respecting the power
of the First Amendment are crucial to the American way of life, violence
in American schools is a compelling reason to regulate First Amendment
speech in the school environment. Bullying is a problem in American
schools and its tragic consequences have been witnessed time and again.
Other consequences are not as visible, but every child who misses
school, does not take advantage of an educational opportunity, or suffers
poor grades due to bullying is another reason to remedy this problem.
Current Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence does not allow
schools to effectively combat bullying, and neither does any
Congressional legislation. While state anti-bullying statutes are valuable
steps in the right direction, not all states have adopted legislation of this
type. Even those states with anti-bullying statutes in place have yet to
face a challenge to their constitutionality. A national standard would
provide an opportunity to fully test the constitutionality of an antibullying statute. In addition, passing a national anti-bullying statute
under the Spending Clause would allow Congress to make the statute
applicable in all states and in all public schools across the nation.
A national anti-bullying statute as proposed in this Note would
allow schools to address all bullying, whether physical, verbal, or
psychological. The proposed model statute draws on Supreme Court
standards for student speech, legislation dealing with sexual harassment
in schools, and analogizes non-student speech legislation to the school
environment. The model statute combines the best sections of state antibullying statutes to form a single, uniform, comprehensive standard.
Passage of a federal anti-bullying statute raises the specter of a First
Amendment challenge. While the Supreme Court has been rather
unbending in its school free speech jurisprudence, the potentially tragic
consequences of bullying cannot truly be avoided without restricting
some speech in schools. If faced with a First Amendment challenge to
this Note’s proposed Model Statute, the Court would need to exercise
flexibility with its dogged protection of free speech in schools. Various
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state anti-bullying statutes have yet to be tested in court. In balancing
competing values and fully appreciating the consequences of
unrestrained student free speech rights, the Supreme Court should
conclude that to reach their full potential students need a safe school
environment and protection from bullying. If an anti-bullying statute
such as the one proposed in this Note had been in place in Littleton,
Colorado, perhaps the thirteen lives lost that day would still be with us
today.
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